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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

v.

:

GERALD GARRETT,

:

Case No. 920054-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OP APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992) which grants original appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over appeals in criminal cases,
except capital and first degree felonies.

The defendant, Mr.

Gerald Garrett, was convicted of possession of a stolen vehicle, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112
(Supp. 1991) .
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Was Defendant's trial attorney ineffective because she failed

to challenge the prosecution1s use of its first three peremptory
challenges to exclude the only minority members of the venire?
2.

Was Defendant's trial attorney ineffective because she offered

a jury instruction on reasonable doubt which was given by the

trial court which contained incorrect statements of law?
3. Was sufficient evidence presented to sustain a conviction?
With respect to the first and second issues, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed question of law
and fact.

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State

v. Johnson, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Where

no claim of ineffectiveness has been presented to the trial court,
an appellate court may review the record to determine on appeal
whether counsel's performance constituted ineffective assistance
as a matter of law.

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748

F.2d 125, 133-34 (3d Cir. 1984); Johnson, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. at
18-19.
Insufficiency of evidence claims, such as that raised by
the third issue, require an appellate court to view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict.
P. 2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989).

State v. Gardner, 789

If the evidence is so inconclusive

that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt of
the

defendant's

conviction.

guilt, the

appellate

court

must

reverse

the

State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App.

1990) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES
Any constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules relevant to the disposition of this appeal are set forth in the text
of this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Gerald Garrett, was charged with one count of
possession of a stolen vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (Supp. 1991).
Garrett was tried before a jury.

(R. 5-6)

Mr.

At the close of the State's

case, defense counsel moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds
that (1) the State had failed to prove that Mr. Garrett possessed
the vehicle knowing or believing it to be stolen; (2) the State
had

failed

to prove that Mr. Garrett intended

to permanently

deprive the owner of the use of the vehicle; and (3) Mr. Garrett
provided a satisfactory explanation of his possession of the vehicle to officers.

(R. 275-76) The trial court denied the motion.

(R. 276) The jury convicted Mr. Garrett as charged.

(R. 89)

After being committed to the Utah State Prison for a
90-day evaluation (R. 124), Defendant was sentenced to a term of
incarceration of from one to fifteen years and fined.

(R. 130)

The sentence was stayed and Defendant was placed on probation for
three years. (R. 130-31) Judgment was imposed on December 20, 1991
(R. 130) (Addendum A) and a timely notice of appeal was filed on
January 6, 1992.

(R. 131a).
FACTS

On June 29, 1991, Gerald and Josephine Hood reported to
police that their 1980 Cadillac Seville with Texas license plates
was missing.

(R. 230)

Mrs. Hood had parked the car in a parking

_^_

lot at 285 South 200 West in Salt Lake City the night before.
(R. 228) Mr. Hood surmised that someone had taken his keys from a
work bench in his son's garage the day before the car was reported
missing.

(R. 240-41)
On Sunday, June 29, before the Hoods reported their car

missing, Officer Kent Bigelow was patrolling near Pioneer Park on
Salt Lake City's west side.

(R. 252)

Bigelow noticed a white

Cadillac with Texas plates that "looked out of place being in
Pioneer Park."

(R. 252)

Bigelow testified that the car was

parked and "fully occupied" and that the person in the driver's
seat had marks on his face and a bandaged hand.
Approximately

(R. 252-53)

fifteen minutes after he left the area, Bigelow

heard a broadcast about the Hood car.

Bigelow immediately recog-

nized the car which he had seen at Pioneer Park as the stolen
vehicle and responded accordingly.

(R. 254)

When Bigelow arrived back at Pioneer Park, other officers were already present and were taking people out of the car.
(R. 255)

Bigelow saw Mr. Garrett about forty yards away from the

car and recognized him as the person who had been in the driver's
seat earlier.
car.

(R. 255)

Bigelow questioned Mr. Garrett about the

Bigelow testified that Mr. Garrett stated the car belonged

to Gerald Hood who had been arrested and whom Mr. Garrett was
going to bail out of jail.

(R. 255-56)

Bigelow testified that

Mr. Garrett indicated that the keys to the car were in his front
pocket;

Bigelow

removed

the keys

from

Mr. Garrett's

pocket.

(R. 257)
Mr. Garrett testified that a man named Jerry with the
car was in Pioneer Park earlier that morning and that Jerry and
several other people, including Mr. Garrett, had gone to a grocery
store to get food and beer.

(R. 279-80)

Mr. Garrett testified

after the group returned to the park, Jerry gave him the car keys
to turn on the radio and get beer from the trunk.

When the police

arrived, Mr. Garrett testified that Jerry told him to watch the
car because he (Jerry) "might have a warrant."

(R. 281)

Mr.

Garrett stated that he did not point Jerry out to police because
he was never asked and the police "made up their mind that they
were going to take me to jail."

(R. 283)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On appeal, Mr. Garrett first asserts that his trial
attorney

was

ineffective

prosecutor's use of his

because

she

did

not

first three peremptory

challenge

the

challenges to

remove the only three minority members from the jury panel.

The

use of racially motivated peremptory challenges is prohibited.

In

this

case

counsel's

failure

constituted

deficient

performance

which prejudiced Mr. Garrett.
The second issue raised on appeal concerns a reasonable
doubt instruction proposed by defense counsel and accepted by the
trial court.

According to recent cases from the Utah Supreme

Court and this Court, the instruction misstates the law on reason-
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able doubt.

By offering such an instruction, counsel's perform-

ance was deficient and prejudiced Mr. Garrett.
The final contention on appeal is that the evidence was
insufficient to convict Mr. Garrett.

Specifically, no evidence

was presented which indicated that Mr. Garrett intended to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle.
ARGUMENT
The following prefatory material is applicable to the
ineffectiveness issues raised in Points I and II.

Ordinarily,

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are addressed by collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings; however, in some circumstances the claim may be raised on direct appeal.

State v.

Johnson, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Such

circumstances exist when the defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the trial record is adequate on the issue.
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133-34 (3d
Cir. 1984); Johnson, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18.

The circumstances

are present for this Court to review the ineffectiveness claim
raised in this case on direct appeal.
In cases involving ineffectiveness claims, Utah courts
have adopted the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984):
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed
the
defendant
by
the
Sixth
Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show

-6-

that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.
See also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).

In

short, to demonstrate ineffectiveness, the defendant must demonstrate deficient performance which resulted in prejudice.
POINT I
DEPENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE
SHE FAILED TO OBJECT TO A CLEAR BATSON VIOLATION
DURING JURY SELECTION BY THE PROSECUTOR.
The jury venire in this case apparently included three
minorities:

Lisa Gallegos Turner, a Hispanic (although defense

counsel failed to establish that fact) (R. 150-51);

Siulavai

Leota, a native Samoan (R. 153); and Ilaisaane Mokofisi, a native
Tongan.

(R. 157)

Two of the three, Ms. Gallegos and Ms. Leota,

answered only the perfunctory introductory questions asked by the
trial

court which

(R. 150-54)

indicated

no bias against the prosecution.

(Ms. Gallegos1 entire voir dire is reproduced in

Addendum B while Ms. Leotafs voir dire appears in Addendum C. )
Ms.

Mokofisi

answered

the

general

introductory

questions

(R. 156-57) and indicated that she had a friend who is a police
officer

but

impartiality.

stated

that

that

fact

would

not

affect

her

(R. 179-80) (Ms. Mokofisifs complete voir dire is

found in Addendum D.)

No other questions were asked of the three

by either attorney or the trial court.

-7-

The prosecutor's first

three peremptory challenges were Ms. Leota, Ms. Gallegos, and Ms.
Mokofisi, in that order.

(R. 86, Addendum E)

The peremptory

challenges were not contested by defense counsel or the trial
court.

Mr. Garrett now alleges that his counsel's failure to con-

test the prosecutor's actions constituted ineffectiveness.
In this case defense counsel's performance was clearly
deficient.

Defense counsel did not contest the prosecutor's

apparently racially-motivated use of peremptory challenges and did
nothing to even preserve the record with regard to one of the
venireman's ethnic or racial background.
In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 203-04 (1965), the
United States Supreme Court recognized that a "State's purposeful
or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal
Protection Clause."

In order to preserve the historical sanctity

of the peremptory challenge, the Swain court refused to examine a
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in any individual case.
380 U.S. 221-22.
tion

challenge,

Rather, in order to prevail on an equal proteca

defendant

was

required

to

demonstrate

continuous, systematic removal of minorities from venires by a
prosecutor.

380 U.S. at 223.

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court
eliminated the necessity for a defendant to demonstrate systematic
discrimination.

In Batson, the Court identified the harm done by

discrimination in the jury selection process.

-8-

"The harm from dis-

criminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the
defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community.
Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system
of justice."

476 U.S. at 87.

The Court then outlined how a

defendant could demonstrate discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in an individual case:
These principles support our conclusion that a
defendant may establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in selection of the
petit jury solely on evidence concerning the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges
at the defendant's trial. To establish such a
case, the defendant first must show that he is
a member of a cognizable racial group, and that
the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the
defendant's race.
Second, the defendant is
entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there
can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind
to discriminate." Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
[559] at 562, 97 L.Ed 1244, 73 S.Ct. 891 [at
892(1953)]. Finally, the defendant must show
that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor
used that practice to exclude the veniremen
from the petit jury on account of their race.
This combination of factors in the empaneling
of the petit jury, as in the selection of the
venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.

Once the defendant makes a prima facie
showing, the burden shifts to the State to come
forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. Though this requirement
imposes a limitation in some cases on the full
peremptory character of the historic challenge,
we emphasize that the prosecutor's explanation
need not rise to the level justifying exercise

-9-

of a challenge for cause. But the prosecutor
may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case
of discrimination by stating merely that he
challenged jurors of the defendant's race on
the assumption - or his intuitive judgment that they would be partial to the defendant
because of their shared race.
476 U.S. at 96-97 (citations omitted).1

Thus Batson permitted an

individual defendant to challenge a prosecutor's use of discriminatory peremptory challenges in an individual case.
In State v. Cantu, 778 P. 2d 517 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu
II"), the Utah Supreme Court delineated the elements necessary to
make a prima facie case in Batson-type cases.2

The Court stated

the elements include (1) as complete a record as possible, (2) a
showing that the excluded veniremen belong to a cognizable group

!Any inference from Batson that the defendant and the excluded
veniremen must be of the same race was recently dispelled by
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
, 113 L.Ed. 2d 411 (1991). Powers
specifically held that a defendant may object to a prosecutor's
racially-motivated use of peremptory challenges regardless of
whether the defendant and the excluded veniremen are of the same
race. 113 L.Ed. 2d at 428-29. In State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329,
340 (Utah 1991), issued shortly after Powers, the Utah Supreme
Court held "that no standing requirement exists which requires the
defendant to be of the same race as the challenged juror." See
also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 488-520 (1990) (separate
opinions of Kennedy, J., Marshall, J., and Stevens, J.).
2

In State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 595 (Utah 1988) ("Cantu I") the
Court had previously stated that a prima facie case to attack a
peremptory challenge under Batson was established by showing:
(1) that [the defendant] is a member of a cognizable racial group, (2) that the prosecution
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from
the panel members of the defendant's race, and
(3) that all the relevant facts and circumstances raise an inference that the prosecution
used its peremptory challenges to exclude
veniremen from the petit jury on account of
their race.
-10-

"under the representative cross-section rule,"3 and (3) a "showing
that there exists 'a strong likelihood that such persons are being
challenged because of their group association rather than because
of any specific bias,1"

778 P.2d

at 518 quoting People v.

Wheeler, 22 Cal 3d 258, 280, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 905, 583 P.2d 748,
764 (1978).
If a prima facie case of discrimination is established,
the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral
explanation for the exclusion of the jurors in question.

In Cantu

II the Utah Supreme Court adopted criteria set forth in State v.
Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988), to evaluate a prosecutor's
explanation.

Slappy1s list of factors "that may cast doubt upon

the legitimacy of a purportedly race-neutral explanation" because
they "tend to show that the state's reasons are not actually supported by the record or are an impermissible pretext" include:
(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared
by the juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory examination,
assuming neither the trial court nor opposing
counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling
the juror out for special questioning designed
to evoke
a certain
response,
(4) the
prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts
of the case, and (5) a challenge based on
reasons equally applicable to juror[s] who
were not challenged.

After Powers and Span the first two requirements have been eliminated because those cases make the removal of a minority juror on
account of race a Batson violation regardless of the defendant's
race.
3

In State v. Span the Utah Supreme Court clarified the
cognizability requirement. The Court held that the fair crosssection standard of Wheeler was not applicable in equal protection
-11-

Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22.
In the context of this case, the issue is whether Mr.
Garrett's

trial

attorney

was

ineffective

because she did not

attack the prosecutor's use of apparently racially-motivated peremptory challenges.
"falls

below

an

Counsel's performance is deficient if it
objective

"specific, identified

standard

of

reasonableness"

and

acts or omissions fall outside the wide

range of professionally competent assistance."

State v. Frame,

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Severance, 182 Utah Adv.
Rep. 32, 34 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Clearly, Mr. Garrett's counsel should have been aware of
the Batson issue.

All four of the Batson cases decided by Utah

appellate courts originated in counsel's office.

State v. Span,

819 P.2d 329, 330 (Utah 1991); State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah
1989); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 592 (Utah 1988); State v.
Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 771 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Counsel was

dealing with a prosecutor's office with a long history of discriminatory juror selection practices.

See e.g., Salt Lake County

Attorney Trial Manual, 15-16 (1978) (Addendum F) .

Because Mr.

cases involving a Batson-type challenge. Rather, the Court stated
that "the Castaneda - Biaggi test, which focuses on the
intentional exclusion of an individual on the basis of membership
in a group, is more appropriate to the Batson peremptory challenge
case." 819 P.2d at 342 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1977) and United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) ) .

-12-

Garrett is

Black (R. 193) and Powers v. Ohio which eliminated

standing requirements to raise Batson challenges had been issued
less than five months before, Mr. Garrettfs trial counsel's awareness of the issue should have been heightened.

The right at

issue, a defendant's right to a fair trial, is not an inconsequential right; it is at the very core of our judicial system.4
Counsel simply could not ignore such a fundamental right as part
of trial strategy.
Despite the incomplete record provided by Mr. Garrett's

4

Arguably, the prosecutor's apparently racially-motivated peremptory challenges amounted to plain error which the trial court
should have corrected. In Span, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Discriminatory peremptory challenges harm the
individual criminal defendant and the juror who
is the subject of discrimination, and they are
an affront to the judicial system. Despite the
long-standing tradition of restricting judicial
interference in the exercise of peremptory
challenges, the judiciary cannot be a party to
the discriminatory use of the challenge. The
discriminatory peremptory challenge of a minority juror simply because a prosecutor believes
that the juror's race may influence the juror's
decision in the case is offensive regardless of
the defendant's race. The assumption that a
minority juror cannot fairly hear a case
because of his or her race or ethnic origin
simply has no place in the American system of
justice. Such an assumption is antithetical to
the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution.
819 P.2d at 340. If the "judiciary cannot be a party to the discriminatory use of the challenge," then a judge should require a
prosecutor to explain his apparently racially-motivated peremptory
challenges without prompting from the defense. The constitutional
violation would be obvious. See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769,
779 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

-13-

trial counsel, a Batson challenge could easily have been raised.5
While virtually nothing is apparent from the record
juror Gallegos1
Jurors Leota
groups.

regarding

ethnicity, although she is arguably Hispanic,

and Mokofisi were clearly members

For example, Ms. Leota stated,

of cognizable

l! f

I m original (sic) from

the island of Samoa, and Ifve lived in Hawaii, that's where I went
to school at . . . ."

(R. 153)

Ms.

Mokofisi stated "I was born

and raised on the island of Tonga until I was twenty-first (sic),
and we moved up to the United States with my parents.11

(R. 157)

The jurors were members of cognizable minority groups as defined
by Span, 819 P.2d at 342.
Additionally there is a strong likelihood that the three
women were challenged because of their group association rather
than any specific bias.

Cantu II, 778 P. 2d 15 518.

For example,

none of the three women was asked any questions by the prosecutor
and

none

of

prosecution.

the

three

demonstrated

any

bias

toward

the

Any reason given for striking any of these three

women would be equally applicable to virtually all of the other
jurors.

Indeed, the only thing that distinguished these three

women from any of the other jurors is their race and ethnicity.
It is particularly egregious that these three were the subjects of
the prosecutor's first three peremptory challenges.

5

See e.g. E.

Trial counsel's failure to perfect the record on the Batson
issue should, by itself, be considered deficient performance.
-14-

Krauss

&

B.

Bonora,

Jurywork:

§4.02[2][b][ii] at 4-12 (1992).

Systematic

Techniques

The "relevant facts and circum-

stances raise an inference that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude" these three jurors on the basis of
race in violation of Batson.

Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 595.

A prima

facie case could easily have been established.
In Span
of discriminatory

the Utah Supreme Court firmly condemned the use
peremptory

"American system of justice."

challenges

as an affront to the

819 P. 2d at 340.

Trial counsel's

failure to even raise the issue can only be termed deficient.
Ineffectiveness also requires a showing of prejudice to
the defendant.

However, in cases of constitutional error such as

this a defendant's "conviction could only be affirmed by showing
that the error was 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
v. Harrison, 805 P.2d

769, 780

State

(Utah Ct. App. 1991) quoting

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1988).

See also State v.

Numerous studies and cases

have discussed the impact that minority jurors have on the deliberative process.

See, e.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.

187, 193-94 (1946) (In rejecting the government's contention that
an all-male panel drawn from diverse groups would be equally representative as a panel which included women, the Court stated "a
community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from a
community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one
on the other is among imponderables.").

See also Taylor v.

Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328
U.S.

217

(1946);

(Cal. 1978).

People

v.

Wheeler,

583

P.2d

748,

754-58

The inclusion of such jurors alters the process and

their deliberate exclusion is clearly prejudicial to a defendant
and the justice system.

The nature of the prejudice and who

should bear the consequences of it were stated in Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972):
Moreover, we are unwilling to make the
assumption that the exclusion of Negroes has
relevance only for issues involving race.
When any large and identifiable segment of the
community is excluded from jury service, the
effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human
experience, the range of which is unknown and
perhaps unknowable.
It is not necessary to
assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude,
as we do, that their exclusion deprives the
jury of a perspective on human events that may
have unsuspected importance in any case that
may be presented.
It is in the nature of the practices here
challenged that proof of actual harm, or lack
of harm, is virtually impossible to adduce.
For there is no way to determine what jury
would have been selected under a constitutionally valid selection system, or how that jury
would have decided the case. Consequently it
is necessary to decide on principle which side
shall suffer the consequences of unavoidable
uncertainty. See Speiser v Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525-526, 2 L. Ed. 2d 14670, 1472, 78 S.
Ct. 1332 (1958); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
370-373, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 378-381, 90 S. Ct.
1068 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
In
light of the great potential for harm latent
in an unconstitutional jury-selection system,
and the strong interest of the criminal defendant in avoiding that harm, any doubt should
be resolved in favor of giving the opportunity
for challenging
the jury
to too many
defendants, rather than giving it to too few.
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(footnotes omitted).
Mr. Garrettfs

trial counsel was ineffective

for her

failure to raise and perfect the record on the Batson issue. This
Court should reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial or,
in

the

alternative,

remand

for

a

hearing

regarding

the

prosecution's basis for its challenges.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE
SHE SUBMITTED A JURY INSTRUCTION WHICH WAS GIVEN
BY THE TRIAL COURT WHICH DID NOT ACCURATELY
CONVEY THE CONCEPT OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
Defendant's counsel proposed, and the trial court gave,
the jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt.

The instruction

stated in part:
It is not required that the State prove
guilt beyond all possible doubt. The test is
one of reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt
is a doubt based upon reason and common sense
—the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of
such a convincing character that a reasonable
person would not hesitate to rely and act upon
it in the most important of his own affairs.
The jury will remember that a defendant is
never to be convicted on mere suspicion or
conjecture.
The burden is always upon the prosecution to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
(R.32, 101).

(The instructions in question are reproduced in

their entirety in Addenda G and H. )
instruction,

counselfs

performance

-1 7-

However, in offering this

was

deficient

because

the

instruction did not adequately convey the concept of reasonable
doubt as defined by the Utah Supreme Court and this Court.
In State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147-49 (Utah 1989),
a majority of the Utah Supreme Court adopted an analysis for the
review of the appropriateness of a reasonable doubt instruction.
That review essentially adopted the analysis of Justice Stewart
expressed in dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82
(Utah 1989).

This Court has noted that any reasonable doubt

instruction must meet the Johnson analysis.

State v. Pedersen,

802 P.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Under the Johnson/Ireland analysis, acceptable reasonable doubt instructions must first "specifically state that the
State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt."
P. 2d at 13 81.
a

proper

Ireland, 77 3

Second, the Johnson/Ireland analysis requires that

reasonable

doubt

instruction

does not

state that a

reasonable doubt "is one which would govern or control a person in
the more weighty affairs of life."
Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 13 32.

Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381;

The Utah Supreme Court stated that an

instruction which discusses the "weighty affairs of life" "tends
to diminish and trivialize the constitutionally required burdenof-proof standard."

Ireland, 773 P. 2d at 1381.

This is so

because, "Nothing that one ordinarily does in the course of a normal life span is comparable to the decision to deprive another of
either his or her life or liberty by voting to convict for a
crime."

Id.

This Court has held that nothing in Johnson or

Ireland requires that the reasonable doubt instruction "must specifically

negate

the

'weighty

Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 13 32.

decisions

of

life1

analogy."

However, clearly the proper reasona-

ble doubt instruction will not contain "weighty affairs of life"
language.
Finally,

under

the

Johnson/Ireland

analysis

"it

is

inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a
possibility . . . ."
P.2d

at 13 32.

because

"a

Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1382; Pedersen, 802

The prosecution burden must not be diminished

possibility

may

constitute

a

reasonable

doubt."

Ireland, 77 3 P.2d at 1382. A proper instruction may eliminate the
possibility that a reasonable doubt can be based on a fanciful or
wholly speculative possibility.

Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 13 32.

In Johnson, the following instructions which were combined to describe reasonable doubt for the jury in that case were
held to be erroneous:
INSTRUCTION NO. 11
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that
degree of proof that satisfies the mind and
convinces the understanding of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it. It must
arise from the evidence or lack of evidence in
the case.
If, after an impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence, you can honestly say that you are not satisfied of the
defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable
doubt; but if, after such impartial consideration and comparison of all the evidence, you
can truthfully say that you have an abiding
conviction of the defendant's guilt such as
you would be willing to act upon in the more
weighty and important matters relating to your
own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt.

INSTRUCTION NO. 12
The law does not require demonstration of
that degree of proof which, excluding all possibility
of
error,
produces
absolute
certainty, for such degree of proof is rarely
possible. Only that degree of proof is necessary which convinces the mind and directs and
satisfies the conscience of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it.
Johnson, 774 P. 2d at 1147-48.

A majority of the Supreme Court

held that those instructions combined to misstate the law because
they did not meet the requirements set forth above.
In Pedersen, this Court held that the following instruction was a satisfactory expression of the law:
INSTRUCTION NO. 7
All presumptions of law, independent of
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a
defendant is presumed innocent until he is
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden
is upon the state to prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require
proof to an absolute certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based
on reason and one which is reasonable in view
of all the evidence.
It must be reasonable
doubt and not a doubt which is merely fanciful
or imaginary or based on wholly speculative
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is that degree of proof which satisfies the
mind, convinces the understanding of those who
are bound to act conscientiously upon it and
obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable
doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and
women would entertain, and it must arise from
the evidence or the lack of evidence in this
case.

_on_

Pedersen, 802 P. 2d at 1331.
tion was satisfactory

The Court stated that this instruc-

because it specifically

stated that the

State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt and the definition
of reasonable doubt in the instruction did not
trivialize

the

standard.11

constitutionally

required

"diminish and
burden-of-proof

Further, the instruction did not eliminate the chance

that a possibility could rise to the level of reasonable doubt.
Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 1332.
In the present case, the instruction offered by defense
counsel

and

given

Johnson/Ireland
instruction.

by

the

trial

court

failed

all

of

the

requirements for an acceptable reasonable doubt

First, the instruction does not "specifically state

that the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt."

In

fact, the instruction does not even state that the defendant
should be convicted "only if guilt is shown beyond a reasonable
doubt." Pedersen, 802 P. 2d at 13 32.
that

The instruction does state

"the burden is always on the prosecution to prove guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt," but the instruction never states that
the defendant can be convicted only if the State shows guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.

In other words, the standard which the

jury is to apply to convict is never stated.
Second, while the instruction does not contain "weighty
affairs of life" language, it substitutes, "the most important of
his own affairs" language.

Merely trading one trivializing con-

cept for another does not act to define reasonable doubt.

The

problem with such language is illustrated in Scurry v United
States, 347 F.2d 468, 470 (D. C. Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 389
U.S. 883 (1967), where Judge Skelly Wright stated:
A prudent person called upon to act in an
important business or family matter would certainly gravely weigh the often neatly balanced
considerations and risks tending in both
directions.
But, in making and acting on a
judgment after so doing, such a person would
not necessarily be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he made the right judgment.
Human experience, unfortunately, is to the
contrary.
Justice Stewartfs concerns expressed in Ireland about the "weighty
affairs" language are equally applicable to the "most important of
his own affairs" language in this case.

In Ireland, Justice

Stewart stated:
The mental process employed in deciding
that someone has committed a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt is different from the mental
process employed in making decisions in the
"more weighty affairs of life." In making the
latter type decision, a person looks forward
and makes a decision about future conduct. A
degree of risk is always inherent in such a
decision, and usually the degree of risk based
on doubt about future events is significant.
The process employed in making such decisions
is only partly a matter of assessment of past
facts; instead, the decision often rests on a
degree of hope, determination, and frequently,
personal resolve. In most cases, the decision
is revocable, but whether or not revocable, it
is at least salvageable.
A
decision
to
convict
always
looks
backward; it is concerned only about resolving
conflicting versions of factual propositions
about a past event. It is always irrevocable
as to the jurors. . . . A jury must have a
greater assurance of the correctness of its
decision, if it is to comply with the constitutional mandate, than the individual jurors

_oo_

are likely to have in making the "weighty"
decisions they confront in their own lives.
Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381.

(Stewart, J., dissenting).

In this

case mere substitution of "important" for "weighty" cannot obviate
the concerns expressed in Johnson and Ireland.
Finally, the instruction in this case states that "It is
not

required

doubt."

that

the State prove guilt beyond

In effect, the instruction states that reasonable doubt

cannot be based upon a possibility.
tradicts

all possible

Johnson

and

Ireland.

However, this directly con-

The

Johnson/Ireland

analysis

clearly permits reasonable doubt to be based upon a possibility.
The possibility cannot be "fanciful or wholly speculative" but the
language in the instruction in this case does not mention fancy or
speculation.

The instruction only seems to eliminate the fact

that reasonable doubt can be based upon a possibility.

By doing

so, the instruction minimizes the prosecution1s burden of proof.
In other places, the instruction emphasizes the nature of the
prosecutionfs burden of proof, but because of the trivialization
of the burden, at best the instruction leaves jurors confused as
to what that burden truly is.
Counselfs performance in offering the reasonable doubt
instruction was deficient.

Johnson and Ireland were both issued

by the Utah Supreme Court in 1989, and State v. Pedersen was
issued by this Court in 1990.
available

with

which

to

Counsel had all of these cases

construct

-9^-

a proper

reasonable

doubt

instruction.

However, an acceptable instruction was not offered.

Counsel's
defendant.

deficient

performance

prejudiced

the

The defense in the case was based upon the explanation

offered by Mr. Garrett in response to the accusation that he knew
that the vehicle in question was stolen.

Furthermore, the defense

argued that Mr. Garrett's possession of the vehicle was merely a
transitory thing and that he neither knew that the vehicle was
stolen nor that he intended to permanently deprive the owner of
possession of the vehicle.

In such a case, the State should

clearly have to obviate all reasonable doubt and the State's burden should not be minimized by the trivialization of the importance of the decisions facing the jurors or by the fact that their
decision may, in fact, rest upon a possibility.

Counsel's failure

to construct a proper reasonable doubt instruction was a deficient
performance which prejudiced Mr. Garrett.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A
CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE.
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel moved
to dismiss because of the State's failure to establish a prima
facie case.

Counsel argued that the State had not proved that Mr.

Garrett knew that the property was stolen or that he had the
intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion.

(R. 27 5)

(R. 276)

In reviewing an insufficiency claim, the appellate court

must "view the evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from
it, in the light most favorable to the verdict."
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989).
inferences

are so

State v.

If "the evidence and its

'inconclusive or inherently

improbable that

reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted,1" then
the appellate court must reverse the conviction.

State v. Moore,

802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. Petree,
659 P. 2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).

ff

[S]o long as some evidence and

reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, we will not
disturb them."

Moore, 802 P.2d at 738.

Convictions for possession of a stolen vehicle in violation of section 41-1-112 require that the defendant be in possession of the vehicle knowing that the vehicle was stolen. State v.
Graves, 717 P.2d 717, 718 (Utah 1986).

The statue has a mens rea

requirement which has not been precisely defined. However, at the
very least, the mens rea required to commit the crime is "an
intent to procure or pass title to the vehicle." State v. Basford,
799 P.2d 228, 229 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

The Basford Court also

stated that "one of the elements of the crime must include some
form of permanent deprivation, . . . " 799 P.2d at 230.

Indeed, in

Basford the conviction was reversed because the State failed to
demonstrate that the deprivation was permanent and not temporary.
In this case, the jury was instructed that to convict
the defendant it must find that the defendant "possessed said

-2.R-

vehicle with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof."

(R. Ill)

"Purpose to deprive" was defined as "the conscious object to withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use
under circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic
value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost, or to
restore the property finally upon payment of the reward or other
compensation, or to dispose of the property under circumstances
that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it."
No evidence of the defendants

(R. 105)

intent to permanently

deprive the owner of possession of the vehicle was presented to
the jury.

In meeting this Courtfs requirement that a defendant

marshal the evidence which supports conviction the only evidence
that even arguably supports any intent came from Officer Bigelow
who stated that he recognized the defendant as the person in the
driver's seat of the parked vehicle when he first saw it.

Bigelow

testified that when he stopped the defendant, the defendant said
that the keys to the vehicle were in his front pocket and defendant handed Bigelow the registration.

(R. 257)

The defendant,

however, testified that he had the keys only to turn on the radio
and retrieve some beer from the trunk of the vehicle.

(R. 281)

Furthermore, the defendant presented uncontested evidence that he
was unable to drive a car because of a severe vision problem.
(R. 278)

This evidence made more likely the defendants explana-

tion that someone had given him the keys to the car for a temporary

purpose.

No

evidence was presented

-96-

that the defendant

intended to permanently deprive the owner of possession of the
vehicle.

Therefore, just as in Basford, this Court must find that

insufficient evidence supported the State's case.

The only con-

clusion that can be reached is that the defendant did not intend
to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated

above, the defendant, Gerald

Garrett, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle and remand the case to the
trial court for either an evidentiary hearing on the basis of the
prosecutor's challenges to jurors Gallegos, Mokofisi, and Leota,
or for a new trial or, in the alternative, that the Court remand
the case with directions that the charges be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this

/S—'

day of June, 1992.

NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

CURTIS C. NESSETAttorney for Appellant
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General, 236

day of June, 1992.
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
Plaintiff,
Case No. .
Count No.
Honorable Leslie Lewis
E. Matheson
Clerk
Reporter C. Wilson
M. Marks
Bailiff
12-20-91
Date

vs.
Gerald Garrett

Defendant.

to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by C^a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of Possession o f a s t o l e n v e h i c l e
, a felony
of the 2
degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by L. Remal
, and the State being represented by R. Macdougall is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D
D
Rl
D
D
K)
D

to a maximum mandatory term of.
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $_
Stayed
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_
_to

D
D
D
D
h

such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of D State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s)

•/>v-\

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above (d( prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of 3yrS
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
• Commitment shall issue
^
^Q
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Defense Counsel

CO J 3 0

Deputy County Attorney
(White—Court)

(Green—Judae)

Page —
fYellow—Jail/Pnson/APAPi

/Pmk_n*>fonco\

/n«iH««r«w_c.-i

of

Judgment/State ,

Gera1d

G a r r e t t

/CR^^Honorable i f i l H ^
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION

ffl Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole.
D Serve
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing
0 Pay a fine in the amount of $^2? 55 at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole; or • at the rate of +?5% s u r r h a r g p
D Pay restitution in the amount of $
; or • in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of
; or D at a rate to be determined by
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Enter, participate in, and complete any Spe below
program, counseling, or treatment as
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Enter, participate in, and complete the
program at
D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or • vocational training D as directed by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or • with
D Participate in and complete any
training D as directed by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; or D with
!
$ Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs& a l c o h o l
05 Submit to drug testing.
ffl Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs.
$ Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. & a l c o h o l
d Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances.
55 Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
01 Submit to testing for alcohol use.
D Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment.
D Maintain full-time employment.
01 Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling, when released from Orange S t r e e t
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling.
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to
under the Interstate Compact as approved
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution in lieu of
days in jail.
55 Defendant is to commit no crimes.
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on
for a review of this sentence.

ft Defendant Is.to enter.Into,and .complete the Orange Street Community Correctional
D Center tor the mentally 111 Offender Program
ft Defendant fs not to take prescribed mpHiration without thp pprwrissinn of APftP.
ft Defendant is to attend at least 1 AA meeting pbr week when released from Orange Street,
ft Defendant i s t o he h e l d i n j a i l

u n t i l hpH sparp hprnmps a v a i l a h l p at Hrangp S t r p p t

^z.

D

DATED this 7^day of

^ ^ 0 ^

„

, 1 9 ^ / /J

,/y .
/

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Page

O f ^ T

n.om

^

ADDENDUM B

19

THE COURT:

All right, thank you so much.

I

20

think all of the activities that everyone has listed so far

21

are more interesting than spending the day in court.

22

again, let me thank all of you.

23

Ms. Gallegos.

24

MS. TURNER:

25

So

Yes, my name has changed, I'm

married now.

on 130

20

THE COURT:

All right. And what is your last

name presently?
MS. TURNER:
THE COURT:
correction.

All right, thank you for that

And what is your address, Ms. Turner?

MS. TURNER:
Jordan.

Turner.

It's 7927 Linton Drive in West

And I'm a nurse's aide, and I've gone through high

school, and taken classes of different sorts. And my
spouse's name is Gerald Turner, and he's an insulator, and
he has a high school education.

And I have two children,

ages fourteen and almost two, and they don't work.
THE COURT:
is an insulator.

All right, and you said your husband

With what company is he employed?

MS. TURNER:

Right now he's working at Geneva

THE COURT:

All right. And would you indicate

Steel.

for us whether or not you've ever lived in any state other
than Utah?
MS. TURNER:

No, I haven't lived in any other

state.
THE COURT: All right, and what are your sources
of information?
MS. TURNER:

Newspaper, TV, radio, magazines.

THE COURT: And your leisure time activities, or
hobbies or interests?

p-iii

MS. TURNER: Sports of all sorts. And I don't,

1
2

I'm not with any clubs or organizations.
THE COURT: All right, thank you so much, Ms.

3
4

Turner.

0015*
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And will you stand and produce your last name for
6
7

roe? I'm not even going to attempt to.
MS. LEOTA:

My name is Siulavai Leota I live at

8

5119 West Verdugo Drive in Kearns, and I work for the Utah

9

State Tax Commission for the Department of Motor Vehicle at

10

the fairgrounds.

11

junior college.

12

the LDS Church.

And I have two years of education with
And my husband's name is Vai, he works for

13

THE COURT:

I'm sorry, I didn't get his name.

14

MS. LEOTA:

Vai, V-a-i.

15

THE COURT:

Thank you.

16

MS. LEOTA:

And he works for the LDS Church.

17

THE COURT:

What does he do for the LDS Church?

18

MS. LEOTA:

He works maintenance.

19

THE COURT:

All right.

Now, ma'am, you indicated

20

that you worked for the Utah Tax Commission in the Motor

21

Vehicle Department.

22

about what your duties are?

23

MS. LEOTA:

Could you tell us a little bit more

I'm an assistant supervisor for the

24

data processing department, and we do input for

25

registration for all cars and boats and ATVs and

COMPTTTTTDT»7T?n

mT^* %r~ ~ ~

snowmobiles and everything.
THE COURT:

All right.

Do you have any children?

MS. LEOTA:

I have six children.

THE COURT:

What are their ages?

MS. LEOTA:

Twenty-six, twenty-four, twenty-two,

twenty, sixteen, and a seven year old.

I have four girls

and three boys.
THE COURT:

All right.

And as to the adults,

what do they do for a living?
MS. LEOTA:

Okay, my son works for, the

twenty-six year old works for the Huish Detergent.

And my

twenty-four year old daughter—they're all married—she
works for the Marriott Hotel, in their administration
office.

And then I have two at home, sixteen and

seventeen.
THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

And what are

your sources of information?
MS. LEOTA:
magazines.

Okay, newspaper, TV, radio, and

But I have, I'm original from the island of

Samoa, and I've lived in Hawaii, that's where I went to
school at, and then I went to California, I lived in
California.
THE COURT:
this.

All right, thank you.

Let me ask you

Do you have any leisure time activities or hobbies

or interests?

oo 1
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

MS. LEOTA:

Well, sports.

THE COURT:

All right, and clubs or organizations

that you belong to?
MS. LEOTA:

I don't belong to any organizations.

THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

C0H4
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Sacco.
Ms. Mokofisi.

I'm sure I did not do that

MS. MOKOFISI:

My name is Ilaisaane Mokofisi, and

justice.

18

I live on 9041 South Kenyon Circle, West Jordani.

19

occupation, I 'm a licensed day care,, and I baby' sit kids in

20

my neighborhood.

21

high school.

My

And my level of education, I1 ve completed

My husband's name is Asaeli.
Can you spell that for us ma'am?

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. MOKOFISI: A-s-a-e-1-:L.

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. MOKOFISI:

All right.
And he's a mail clerk at the

00.1
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1

postal service, and he got an associate degree in

2

accounting.

3

The age of my son is thirteen, and a daughter is eleven,

4

and the youngest one is my brother-in-law's, he's in the

5

navy but I take care of her, she's three.

6

in school except the little one.

7

I have two kids of my own, and I raised one.

And they're all

I was born and raised in the on the island of

8

Tonga until I was twenty-first, and we moved up to the

9

United States with my parents. And all the sources of

10

information.

11

belong to any organization.

12

And I love camping, travel, and I'm not

THE COURT:

All right, thank you, Miss Mokofisi.

1/ W* ^ (t
COMPUTERIZED
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THE COURT:

The next hand raised?

MS. MOKOFISI:

Miss Mokofisi.

I have a personal friend, my next

door neighbor, he's a police officer, and he works in West
Jordan.
THE COURT:

All right, do you believe you could

be a fair and impartial juror, even knowing that you have a
neighbor who's involved in law enforcement?
MS. MOKOFISI: Yes.
THE COURT:

All right.

Do you believe that you

could give the same credence to the testimony of a police
officer as any other witness?

That is, giving it no

greater or lesser weight than the testimony of any other
witness?

00.1 ?3
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1

MS. MOKOFISI: Yes.

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. MOKOFISI: Yes.

4

THE COURT:

5

this?

And that was a yes?

All right.

Any other hands raised on

Let's see, we also have Ms. Parker, and we also

05 ! » « O
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ADDENDUM F

1.

General
a.

Juror is disqualified fro^n serving in any case:
i

Felony conviction

ii.

Want of any legal qualification rendering a person
a competent juror.

iii. Unsoundness of mind or body rendering him incapable
of performing juror duties (17-30-17, Utah Code
Annotated)
2.

Particular
a.

Juror is disqualified from serving in action on trial
i.

Implied bias
(a)

Existence of facts ascertained renderning
juror's mind contra to impartiality,

(b)

Lxistence of state of juror's mind contra to
impartiality (77-30-18, Utah Code Annotated)
III
JURY SELECTION -- MECHANICS

After each side has exercised both preemptory challenges and
challenges for cause, if any, the panel will be selected. In
misdemeanor matters, the jury panel may consist of four jurors
and in felony matters of eight jurors.
In making challenges, the baliff will hand the attorney for the
defendant first a card bearing the names of all of the jury
panel; at which time counsel for the defense will strike his
first preemptory challenge indicating that it is defendant's
Bur.ber one challenge and placing his initials after the challenge
Th* card ^"11 then be passed to the State who will exercise his
first prei.i:.ptory challenge in the same fashion and this will
oc?fr until the specified number of preemptory challenges have
bet: exerciced. The panel will then be selected and sworn.
Jurr: Qualifications
1. While there is no specific rule as to which individuals make
good jurors favorable to the prosecution, as a general rule,
the following classifications can be asserted generally:
a.

Technical professionals

Good jurors

b.

School teachers

Poor jurors

c.

Minorities

Poor for blue collar crimes

d.

Minorities

Good for white collar crimes

e.

Physically mfirmed

Good jurors

f.

The very young

Poor jurors

g.

The very old

Good jurors

h.

Caveat

Watch for hearing problems

i.

Civil service

Good jurors

j.

Ex-military

Good jurors

k.

Artists and Musicians

Poor jurors

1.

Bartenders

Poor jurors except on robbery

m>

Insurance men

Very good jurors

n.

People wearing sunglasses

Poor jurors

o.

Some law training

Poor jurors

p.

social workers

Poor jurors

AS A <;ENE?AL RULE, ALWAYS GET RID OF THE ODD JUROR, I.E., WOMEN'S
IIBBER, H1TPY TYPES, THE REVOLUTIONARY, ETC.
AS A RULE OF THUMB, WHEN IN DOUBT -- STRIKE
C.

The Voire Dire
1.

Voire Dire examination in Utah courts is generally done by
the trial judge. Many prosecutors tend to let the judge do
all of the work, but there may be certain questions that
the judge will not ask or not ask properly that the prosecutor will want to ascertain. The prosecutor may ask the
questions himself, but more properly he should request of
the Court that a specific question be asked the individual
juror or the panel in general. A prosecutor should be particularly mindful of the following*kinds of cases and proceed
with a more detailed and complex voire dire if you feel
that the judge has not properly examined the panel. The
following kinds of issues should be dealt with some care on
voire dire:
a.

Qualification in capital cases.

b.

Circumstantial evidence, i.e., not second class evidence

(16)
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CANDICE A. JOHNSON, (#4745)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444

Deouty C'OJK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

:

v.
GERALD GARRETT,

:

Defendant.

Case No. 911900988FS
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS

:

The defendant, GERALD GARRETT, by and through his attorney
of record, CANDICE A. JOHNSON, respectfully request this court in
its charge to the jury to submit Instruction Nos.
through

inclusive.
DATED this the

)l/>

day of August, 1991.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Jury Instructions to
Ernie Jones at the office of the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, this the
1991.

/^

day of August,

INSTRUCTION NO.

The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of crime.

Thus

a defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a "clean slate"
—

with no evidence against him.

And the law permits nothing but

legal evidence presented before the jury to be considered in support
of any charge against the accused.

So the presumption of innocence

alone is sufficient to acquit a defendant, unless the jurors are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after
careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the
case.
It is not required that the State prove guilt beyond all
possible doubt.

The test is one of reasonable doubt.

doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense —

A reasonable
the kind of

doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act.

Proof

beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a
convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to
rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs.
The jury will remember that a defendant is never to be
convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture.
The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.

This burden never shifts to a defendant;

for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the
burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.

00032

So if the jury, after careful and impartial consideration
of all the evidence in the case, has a reasonable doubt that a
defendant is guilty of the charge, it must acquit.

If the jury

views the evidence in the case as reasonably permitting either of
two conclusions —

one of innocence, the other of guilt —

the jury

should of course adopt the conclusion of innocence.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

Plaintiff,

CRIMINAL NO. 911900988 FS

vs.

JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS

GERALD GARRETT,
Defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO. 1
You are instructed that the defendant

GERALD GARRETT, is

charged by the information which has been duly filed with the
commission of POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE.

The Information

alleges:

POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE, a Second Degree Felony,
at 2315 South 200 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on
or about June 30, 1991, in violation of Title 41, Chapter 1,
Section 112, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, GERALD GARRETT, a party to the offense, had in his
possession a vehicle which he knew or had reason to believe had
been stolen or unlawfully taken;

00090

INSTRUCTION NO.

/3

The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of crime.

Thus

a defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a "clean slate"
—

with no evidence against him.

And the law permits nothing but

legal evidence presented before the jury to be considered in support
of any charge against the accused.

So the presumption of innocence

alone is sufficient to acquit a defendant, unless the jurors are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after
careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the
case.
It is not required that the State prove guilt beyond all
possible doubt.

The test is one of reasonable doubt.

doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense —

A reasonable
the kind of

doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act.

Proof

beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a
convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to
rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs.
The jury will remember that a defendant is never to be
convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture.
The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.

This burden never shifts to a defendant;

for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the
burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.

OO.l Oi

So if the jury, after careful and impartial consideration
of all the evidence in the case, has a reasonable doubt that a
defendant is guilty of the charge, it must acquit.

If the jury

views the evidence in the case as reasonably permitting either of
two conclusions —

one of innocence, the other of guilt —

should of course adopt the conclusion of innocence.

- 2 -
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